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T his paper looks at Brazil’s fiscal policy during the two
administrations of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso: 1995-1998
and 1998-2002. It stresses that the authorities’ austere attitude was as
important as institutional and structural reform for the fiscal adjustment
that followed the 1998-1999 crisis. The principal cause of the fiscal
deterioration in 1995-1998 was the reduction in the primary balance
rather than the increase in the interest burden, while the fiscal adjustment
in 1999-2002 was largely due to increased revenues, as primary public
expenditure by the federal government continued to grow in real terms.
We consider the outlook for fiscal sustainability and conclude that, to
preserve the country’s hard-won fiscal discipline, the austere fiscal
attitude shown recently by the authorities should be permanently
embedded into fiscal institutions.
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   This paper is a shortened version of Giambiagi and Ronci (2004),
and it has benefited from comments by Max Alier, Fabio Barbosa,
Nigel Chalk, Martin Gilman, Vincent Moissinac, Laura Papi, Murilo
Portugal, Hemant Shah and Evan Tanner. The views expressed in this
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Brazilian government.
1 The year 1990 is usually disregarded in analyses of Brazilian fiscal
policy in the 1980s and 1990s, as it was the first year of the Collor
Plan and is considered atypical due to the extraordinary revenues
collected.
2 In this paper, the concept of the public-sector borrowing
requirement (PSBR) refers to the nominal rather than to the operational
result, except where otherwise specified.
3 For our purposes, fiscal institutions include both the legal
framework of fiscal policy and the authorities’  fiscal attitude, as
enforcement of formal rules depends on this. It is important to
emphasize that institutional arrangements are not primarily to be
understood as formal organizations and written laws and regulations.
Institutions are the rules of the game —formal or informal rules—
that are used by societal actors (North, 1990).
I
Introduction
Following the Collor Plan (1990), the average public-
sector primary balance recorded a surplus of 2.9%
between 1991 and 1994. In contrast, following the Real
Plan (June 1994),1 this balance underwent a dramatic
deterioration, averaging a deficit of 0.2% of GDP during
1995-1998. During those years, the authorities’  rhetoric
favoured fiscal austerity, but unrelenting pressure to
increase expenditures more than offset increases in
revenues or cuts in other spending items. Proposals to
set public-sector deficit ceilings simply failed to
generate broad support.
At the end of 1998, Brazil faced a deep external
and fiscal crisis and signed a Stand-By Arrangement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 1999-
2001. Following the sharp exchange-rate devaluation
of January 1999 the agreement was reassessed, and in
2001 it was extended until the end of 2002. In this
context, there was a major policy regime change and
during 1999-2002 the public sector recorded an average
primary surplus of an unprecedented 3.6% of GDP.2
During the second Cardoso term, the public sector was
clearly operating under a hard budgetary constraint in
the form of a floor for the consolidated primary surplus,
implementation of which meant a major institutional
change in the management of the Brazilian public
finances.3
Although day-to-day fiscal policy continued to be
based on floors for the primary surplus rather than
ceilings for the nominal deficit, in effect increases in
financial expenditure had a direct effect on the primary
target. This was apparent in the authorities’  efforts to
ensure that the nominal deficit did not exceed certain
limits, corresponding essentially to a regime of deficit
targeting. For example, the increase in interest rates
during 2001 and its impact on the projection of higher
interest payments in 2002 led the authorities to raise
the primary surplus target for 2002. The original
official target for the year of 2.7% of GDP was raised
to 3.9% of GDP precisely in order to make up for the
higher interest burden.4
This article provides a detailed account of public-
sector finance trends during the two administrations of
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso: 1995-1998 and
1999-2002.5 We argue that the change in the
authorities’  attitude to fiscal policy in the context of
the 1998-1999 balance-of-payments crisis was as
important as the legal and constitutional changes
approved at the end of the first and beginning of the
second Cardoso administrations to bring about the
primary balance shift to 3.7% of GDP between 1995-
1998 and 1999-2002. Only President Castelo Branco’s
reforms (1964-1967) can be compared in scope to
President Cardoso’s, and the latter were implemented
under much more difficult political circumstances.6
Two important messages come out of our account.
First, the principal cause of the fiscal deterioration in
the first Cardoso administration was the deterioration
in the primary balance rather than the increase in the
interest payment burden. Second, the fiscal adjustment
in the second Cardoso administration was to a large
4 The original primary surplus target of 2.7% of GDP for 2002 had
been announced in 2000, in the context of a significant fall in interest
rates, which, as was foreseen at the time, would continue in
subsequent years. After this, however, the nominal Special System
of Clearance and Custody (SELIC) rate, which fell to 15% at the start
of 2001, rose to more than 20% during 2002, making it necessary
to revise the projected numbers for the following year.
5 While the data for this study begin in 1994, for reasons of space
we focus mainly on the fiscal adjustment that took place after 1998.
For an account of the various aspects of fiscal policy during the
1995-1998 period, see Além and Giambiagi (1999). For the period
before the Real Plan in 1994, see Giambiagi (1997).
6 For an account of Castelo Branco’s reforms, see Barbosa, Salazar
and de Faro (1989) and Skidmore (1988).
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extent due to increased revenues, while primary federal
public expenditure rose in real terms during the eight
years of the two administrations. These aspects of
Cardoso’ s fiscal adjustment underline the need to
preserve hard-won fiscal discipline and improve the
adjustment over the coming years. Key to achieving
fiscal sustainability has been the austere fiscal stance
of the recent authorities, which should be permanently
embedded in fiscal institutions.
The article is divided into seven sections. After
this brief introduction, section II reviews the evolution
of the public-sector borrowing requirement (PSBR)
during 1995-2002. Section III highlights the major
factors and structural reforms underlying the fiscal
adjustment since 1999. Section IV deals with
temporary revenue sources since the mid-1990s.
Section V describes the evolution of the public-sector
debt. Section VI demonstrates the importance of the
change in the authorities’  attitude to fiscal policy.
Lastly, section VII presents a summary and
conclusions. The appendix provides empirical evidence
on public debt sustainability during 1995-2002.
II
Overview of the public-sector borrowing
requirement, 1995-2002
The performance of the public-sector finances since
the Real Plan (1994) can be divided into two periods:
1995 to 1998 and 1999 to 2002, each corresponding
to one of President Cardoso’s terms. There were two
major turning points in the policy regime: the first in
1995, when the significant primary balance surpluses
achieved in previous years were rapidly eroded, and
the second in 1999, when a strong fiscal adjustment
was carried out at all levels of government (table 1).
With regard to the major aggregates, four facts
stand out:7
First, until 1998 the federal government recorded
a progressive deterioration in its nominal deficit, partly
because it “ inherited”  debts from individual states,
which in effect represented a “socialization”  of losses,
and partly because tight monetary policy had a greater
impact on its financing costs. As a result, the federal
government’ s nominal borrowing requirements
increased from a third of the total PSBR in 1995 to two
thirds in 1998.
Second, compared with 1991-1994, all three
levels of government showed the same primary balance
deterioration in 1995-1998, followed by a marked
improvement in 1999-2002 (table 2).
Third, interest payments averaged 7% of GDP
throughout 1995-2002, contributing a great deal to the
high average nominal deficit of 5.5% of GDP during the
same period. Although total public debt was relatively
low during the first years of the Real Plan, interest
payments were high as real interest rates came under
severe pressure, partly because of the risk of lending
to the government in an environment of growing fiscal
deterioration, and partly because of the need to attract
external financing to pay for external current-account
deficits following the Asian and Russian crises.8 Using
the extended national consumer price index (IPCA) as
a deflator, the Special System of Clearance and
Custody (SELIC) gross real interest rate averaged 22%
during 1995-1998. Subsequently, it declined to an
average of 10% during 1999-2002. However, this
lower rate applied to a much higher public-sector debt
and, in combination with the effects of currency
devaluation, resulted in continued large interest
payments (figure 1).9
7 Comparing the fiscal outcomes of the first Cardoso administration
with those of the year of the Real Plan (1994) is problematic as 1994
was a relatively atypical year. The primary surplus of 5.4% of GDP
recorded then was well above the average of 2.2% of GDP in the three
preceding years. This is largely explained by the fact that in 1994 tax
revenues benefited both from the end of inflationary erosion and from
the economic boom in the first six months of the plan, while public
spending lagged behind. On the other hand, in 1994 the “above the
line”  primary surplus published by the federal government was almost
1% of GDP below the figure published by the Central Bank (which is
the official figure), leading us to believe that there may have been a
methodological problem in determining the primary balance, so that
this may have been overestimated to some extent. For these reasons,
we chose to compare period averages.
8 see Ferreira and Tulio (2002), p.153.
9 See Garcia and Didier (2000) for an analysis of the determinants
of interest rates in Brazil.
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TABLE 1
Brazil: Public-sector borrowing requirement
(Percentages of GDP)a
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Necesidades de financiamiento
del sector público –27.0 –7.3 –5.9 –6.1 –7.5 –5.8 –3.6 –3.6 –4.6
Gobierno federal –10.2 –2.4 –2.6 –2.6 –4.9 –2.7 –2.3 –2.1 –0.8
Estados y municipios –12.1 –3.6 –2.7 –3.0 –2.0 –3.1 –2.1 –2.0 –3.8
Empresas públicas 4.7 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 –0.1 –0.7 –0.6 0.0
Balance primario 5.2 0.3 –0.1 –1.0 0.0 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.9
Gobierno federal 3.3 0.5 0.4 –0.3 0.6 2.3 1.9 1.8 2.4
Gobierno federal y Banco Central 3.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.3 3.3 2.8 2.9 3.6
Seguridad socialb 0.2 0.0 –0.1 –0.3 –0.8 –1.0 –0.9 –1.1 –1.3
Estados y municipios 0.8 –0.2 –0.5 –0.7 –0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.8
Empresas públicas 1.2 –0.1 0.1 0.1 –0.4 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.7
Pago de intereses –32.2 –7.5 –5.8 –5.1 –7.5 –9.0 –7.1 –7.2 –8.5
Gobierno federal –13.4 –2.9 –2.9 –2.3 –5.5 –5.0 –4.1 –3.9 –3.1
Estados y municipios –12.8 –3.4 –2.2 –2.3 –1.8 –3.4 –2.6 –2.9 –4.6
Empresas públicas –5.9 –1.3 –0.7 –0.5 –0.2 –0.6 –0.3 –0.4 –0.7
Partidas pro memoria
Ajuste del balance (flujos) … … –1.9 1.8 –1.0 –6.9 0.1 –3.9 –7.6
Privatizaciones … … 0.1 1.9 1.3 0.5 1.4 –0.4 –0.8
Otros … … –2.0 –0.1 –2.3 –7.4 –1.3 –3.5 –6.8
Ajuste de la deuda interna … … 0.0 0.0 –0.4 –3.8 –0.4 –1.4 –3.6
Ajuste de la deuda externa … … –0.1 –0.1 –0.3 –2.7 –0.6 –0.6 –3.6
Otros ajustes … … –1.9 0.0 –1.6 –0.9 –0.3 –1.5 0.4
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
a The minus sign indicates a deficit.
b Social security revenues less benefit payments.
TABLE 2
Brazil: Public-sector primary balance
(Period averages as percentages of GDP)a
1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Balance primario 2.9 –0.2 3.6
Gobierno federal 1.6 0.3 2.1
Gobierno federal y Banco Central 1.0 0.6 3.2
Seguridad social 0.6 –0.3 –1.1
Estados y municipiosb 0.7 –0.4 0.6
Empresas públicas 0.7 –0.1 0.9
Federales 1.1 0.2 0.7
Estaduales y municipales –0.4 –0.3 0.2
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
a The minus sign indicates a deficit.
b Social security revenues less benefit payments.
Public-sector borrowing
requirement
   Federal gov rnment
   Sta es and i i alities
   Public-sector enterprises
Primary balance
   Federal gov rnment
      Federal government and Central Bank
      Social securityb
   Sta es and i i alities
   Public-sector enterprises
Interest payments
   Federal gov rnment
   Sta es and i i alities
   Public-sector enterprises
Memor ndum it s
Balance sheet djustment (flows)
   Privatization
   Other
      Domestic debt adjustm nt
      External debt adjustment
      ther djustments
Primary balance
   Federal gov rnment
      Federal g vernment and Central Bank
      Social security
   Sta es and i i alitiesb
   Public-sector enterprises
      Federal
      State and municipal
Fourth, there was the emergence in the fiscal
accounts of a variable that would become crucial for
the dynamics of the public-sector debt: the “balance
sheet adjustment” , which dates back to the period
1995-1998.10 This variable involves “below the line”
factors that do not affect PSBR flows but that modify
the value of the public-sector debt. Privatizations
10 Strictly speaking, the recognition of previously unrecorded old
debts as a balance sheet adjustment began with the Collor
administration with the “ resetting”  of obligations through the so-
called “privatization currencies” , i.e., debts that were accepted as a
means of payment in the sale of State-owned companies.
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FIGURE 1
Brazil: Interest payments and real interest rate
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.














































reduce public debt, while recognizing previously
unrecorded debts and revaluing public debt
denominated in foreign currency due to exchange-rate
devaluations increase it. In net terms, these effects
generated a cumulative change in the public-sector debt
of 19 percentage points of GDP between 1994 and 2002.
III
Fiscal adjustment and reforms
As we explained in the previous section, interest
payments did not account for the decline in the nominal
deficit, because they remained high throughout the
1995-2002 period. We shall now turn our attention to
the causes of the fiscal adjustment since 1999, focusing
on the primary balance results, which exclude interest
payments. At the federal level there was a significant
increase in tax revenues, while non-financial
expenditure grew continuously. At state and municipal
levels, structural and institutional changes led to a
gradual improvement of the primary balance after
1998. Public-sector enterprises’  primary balances have
also improved greatly since 1999, mainly due to the
results of the State oil company (Petrobras).
Both during the first Cardoso administration and,
in particular, during the second one, a number of
important structural and institutional reforms were
carried out in five areas: the fiscal regime of states and
municipalities; privatization of public-sector enterprises;
social security; the financial system, and budget
procedures (box 1). These reforms were closely
associated with the authorities’  ability to carry out the
fiscal adjustment in 1999-2002.
1. The federal government
Table 3 shows the revenue and expenditure breakdown
of the federal government primary balance from 1994
to 2002, based on data published by the Ministry of
Finance.11 Two trends stand out:
11 The data refer to the “above the line”  statistics calculated by the
Brazilian Treasury, which also cover the Social Security and Cen-
tral Bank balances. The difference between that figure and the
“below the line”  primary balance published by the Central Bank,
calculated as borrowing requirements minus nominal interest, is
adjusted for a “ statistical discrepancy”  akin to the errors and
omissions statistic in the balance of payments.
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The fiscal regime of states and municipalities
There was without doubt a genuine change in the fiscal regime of states and municipalities, characterized by
the removal of various sources of structural fiscal imbalances. Among the changes observed, we note:
— the privatization of the majority of banks owned by state governments, closing off a financing source for
state treasuries;
— rigid restrictions on the practice of providing advances on budgetary resources, which was effectively a
mechanism for borrowing from the financial system;
— the blocking of mechanisms for issuing judicial credits (precatórios), i.e., securities for the payment of
judicial settlements with the private sector, which were often used in practice for other purposes and
contributed to the fiscal deterioration of state governments during part of the 1990s;
— the refinancing of state and municipal debts through the federalization of debt securities issued by state
and municipal governments in return for collateralization of their future revenues. This measure prompted
state governments to make fiscal adjustments to repay their debt over a 30-year period (subject to a ceiling
of 30% of revenues in most cases), under penalty of the federal government using its legal powers to
withhold constitutional transfers and even appropriate part of the revenues from the state sales tax on
merchandise and services (ICMS);
— among other things, the Fiscal Responsibility Act (Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal, supplementary law
No. 101 of 4 May 2000) provided for ceilings on payroll expenses in relation to the total revenues of the
state and federal governments, restricted the authorities’  powers (particularly in election years), introduced
transparency rules for reporting public-sector accounts, and prohibited new refinancing of state and
municipal debt by the federal government.
The privatization of public-sector enterprises
Privatization also represented a significant structural change. It removed what had previously been a potential
source of pressure on public-sector spending, associated with the investments of public-sector companies. Had
these returned to the high levels of investment of the early 1980s, they would have put considerable pressure
on the public debt. At the same time, the sale of a number of traditionally loss-making public enterprises such
as the federal railway company eliminated what had been a permanent source of pressure on the public-sector
accounts. With regard to individual state governments, not only did these rid themselves of several loss-making
companies, but the discipline of preparing these companies for privatization in itself brought about a significant
improvement in the management of the remaining state-owned companies.
Social security
The constitutional amendment to the social security scheme, approved in 1998, permitted:
— the introduction of a minimum retirement age for public-sector employees, and a progressive increase in
the retirement age for employees with shorter lengths of service;
— the hiring of new public employees under the general social security regime, without the privileges of the
public-sector employee pension regime, and the setting up of pension funds for new public employees;
— removal from the federal constitution of the formula for calculating pension benefits, thereby making it
possible to enact legislation for this purpose. This was done during 1999-2002 with the passing of a law
on the “social welfare factor” ;a this helped to contain the social security deficit, as the new formula for
calculating pension benefits discouraged early retirement and the underreporting of income.
The financial system
By strengthening the financial system, the reforms addressed potential sources of deficits. The reforms included:
— approval of the Incentive Programme for the Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial
System (PROER);
— privatization of various state banks, in a number of cases following federalization, thereby ending what
had been one of the main sources of fiscal imbalances during the 1980s and 1990s;
— opening up the financial sector further to foreign capital, with the sale of a number of banks to multinational
banking groups, thereby increasing competition within the banking system;
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— the requirement by the Central Bank that banks adopt more rigid lending criteria, leading to a substantial
improvement in the health of the system and reducing its exposure to risk;
— the strengthening of federally owned banks through capitalization, provisions for non-performing loans,
and compliance with the Basel guidelines.
Budget procedures
The Fiscal Responsibility Act also changed the budget procedures for the Budget Guidelines Act (Ley de
Diretrizes Orçamentárias), which is approved by Congress by June of each year and sets the parameters for
the next year’s general federal budget, submitted to Congress in August. The Fiscal Responsibility Act stipulated
that the Budget Guidelines Act should include not only the federal government’s primary result target for the
general federal budget, but also the targets for the following two years. This embryonic medium-term budget
framework has provided an effective form of budgetary constraint: it limits total expenditure and attempts to
make additional expenditure conditional on the resources available. The medium-term budget is a genuine
institutional innovation in Brazil, where budgetary restrictions have traditionally been circumvented.
a See Ornelas and Vieira (1999).
TABLE 3
Brazil: Government primary balance
(Percentages of GDP)a
Period averages
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Total ingresos 18.3 17.5 18.4 20.1 21.7 21.5 22.7 24.4 16.5 18.6 22.6
Transferencias a estados y municipios 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.3 2.7 2.8 3.9
Ingresos netos 15.5 14.7 15.6 17.2 18.1 17.8 18.8 20.1 13.8 15.8 18.7
Gastos no financieros 14.8 14.5 15.4 16.6 16.0 15.9 17.1 17.9 12.4 15.3 16.7
Gastos de la nómina 5.6 5.2 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.6 4.4 5.2 5.3
Prestaciones de seguridad social 5.0 5.3 5.4 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.7 4.4 5.4 6.3
Otros gastos corrientes y de capitalb 4.2 4.0 5.3 5.7 4.9 4.9 5.4 5.6 3.7 4.8 5.2
Discrepancia estadísticac –0.1 0.2 –0.5 0.0 0.2 –0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 –0.1 0.1
Balance primario 0.5 0.4 –0.3 0.6 2.3 1.9 1.8 2.4 1.6 0.3 2.1
Gobierno federal y Banco Central de Brasil
0.5 0.5 0.0 1.4 3.3 2.8 2.9 3.7 1.0 0.6 3.2
Seguridad social 0.0 –0.1 –0.3 –0.8 –1.0 –0.9 –1.1 –1.3 0.6 –0.3 –1.1
Source: Secretary of Economic Policy, Ministry of Finance.
a The minus sign indicates a deficit.
b Includes Central Bank primary balance.
c A positive figure indicates an increase in the primary balance surplus.
t l rev nues
sfers to states and munici alities
Net reve ue
Non-financial expenditures
   P yroll xpenses
   Soci l security benefits
   her cost and capital expensesb
Statistical discrepan yc
Primary bal nce
   Federal gov nment and Central Bank
      of Brazil
   ocial security
— Fiscal revenues increased significantly throughout
the period. Gross federal government revenues
increased from an average of 16.5% of GDP in
1991-1994 to 22.6% in 1999-2002.
— At same time, federal government non-financial
expenditure grew considerably. All the major
categories contributed to this expenditure growth.
Between 1991-1994 and 1999-2002, payroll
expenditure (mainly due to the weight of retired
workers), social security benefits and “ other
expenses”  (excluding transfers to states and
municipalities, payrolls and social welfare
benefits) increased by 0.9, 1.8 and 1.5 percentage
points of GDP respectively. In addition, transfers
to states and municipalities grew by 1.2% of GDP
between the same periods.
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a) Fiscal revenues
For the federal government, the two major
sources of additional revenues were: i) the provisional
financial transactions contribution (CPMF), which was
introduced as a permanent tax (IPMF) at the end of
1993, since when it has been abolished and
reintroduced several times; ii) the contribution to the
financing of the social security system (COFINS), which
was associated with increases in tax rates and a series
of court rulings favouring the government, thanks to
which resistance to the introduction of the
contribution during the early part of the decade was
overcome.12 Between them, these two contributions
accounted for about two thirds of the change in
revenue between 1991-1994 and 1999-2002. At the
same time, there was a continuous decline in
industrial products tax (IPI) revenues (table 4).
Federal expenditure as a proportion of GDP was
contained in 1999-2000 and began to grow again in
2001-2002. A detailed analysis of non-financial
expenditures follows.13
b) Payroll expenses
Federal government payroll expenses rose from
18.5 billion reais in 1995 to 33.2 billion reais in 2001
in nominal terms, despite the fact that public
employees’  pay was “ frozen”  between the two dates;
the first linear adjustment in such salaries since 1995
occurred only in 2002. The reason for this seeming
paradox is that, over time, almost every category
benefited from career reviews, adjustments to the
“curve” , promotions, etc.
Another important component of total government
payroll spending was the expenditure on public-sector
retirees. Overall payroll expenditure was 5.6% of GDP
in 2002 compared to 5% in 1994, as the reduction in
active duty employee payroll expenses was more than
offset by the increase in expenditure on public-sector
retirees, particularly military personnel. The combination
of population ageing and indulgent retirement rules for
public-sector employees contributed significantly to
payroll expenses.14
c) Social security benefits
The other crucial element determining public
spending was social security expenses. After the Real
Plan, social security benefits were adjusted by more
than inflation, resulting in an increase in their average
real value. The social security index rose until 1998,
marked time in 1999 due to higher inflation, and then
resumed its growth trend due to the policy followed
in 2000-2001 of increasing the minimum wage in real
terms (figure 2).15
Social security benefits also grew during the first
years of the Real Plan, the main growth item being
length-of-service pension benefits, which were more
expensive than other pensions (table 5). The length-of-
service pension enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution
grants men and women the right to retire after 35 and
12 From the federal government’s point of view, it made sense to
give priority to an adjustment funded from these contributions rather
than from taxes such as income tax or the industrial products tax
(IPI); as these contributions are not shared with states and
municipalities, the entire revenue gain remains with the federal
government. Conversely, in the case of income tax and the IPI, the
net revenue gain for the federal government is much smaller as
about half the revenues must go to the revenue-sharing fund of the
states and municipalities.
13 See Velloso (1997) for an account of the fiscal situation at the
start of the Real Plan.
14 Retired military personnel have generous pension benefits,
including the transfer of such benefits to unmarried daughters after
the death of the original beneficiary. Some military privileges have
been reduced over the last few years.
15 The social security index was calculated by deflating the nominal
rise in social security benefits by the IPCA price index. Social security
benefits have increased in line with the minimum wage, albeit with
some divergence in a number of years. In cases where basic
remuneration was adjusted by a factor different to that used for
benefits above this floor, the index was weighted by the
multiplication factor (total number of benefits times the floor) with
reference to total with-benefits expenses. The index would allow us
to infer the potential evolution of expenditure in the event that the
quantity of benefits remained constant.
FIGURE 2
Brazil: Social security benefit indexa
(Base: June 1994 = 100)
Source: Social security and authors’  estimates.
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(Period averages as percentages of GDP)a-b
1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002
Total ingresosc 11.9 13.2 16.6
Impuesto de importación 0.4 0.7 0.7
IPI 2.3 2.0 1.6
Impuesto a la renta 3.7 4.5 5.6
Personal 0.2 0.3 0.3
Empresas 1.1 1.5 1.7
Trabajo personal 1.3 1.5 1.7
Rentabilidad del capital 0.7 0.8 1.2
Otros 0.3 0.4 0.7
IPMF/CPMF 0.3 0.4 1.3
IOF 0.7 0.4 0.3
COFINS 1.5 2.2 3.7
PIS/PASEP 1.1 0.9 1.0
Contribución sobre las utilidades netas 0.7 0.9 0.8
Contribuciones de seguridad social de la administración pública 0.1 0.3 0.3
Otros 1.2 0.9 1.3
Partidas pro memoria
Carga tributaria 25.7 28.8 32.8
ICMS 6.7 7.0 7.6
Source: Federal Revenue Secretary, Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE).
a IPI = Industrialized products tax.
IPMF/CPMF = Provisional financial transactions tax/provisional financial transactions contribution.
IOF = Financial operations tax.
COFINS = Contribution to the financing of the social security system.
PIS/PASEP = Social Integration Programme/Public Servants Asset Formation Programme.
ICMS = Sales tax on merchandise and services.
b Data differ from those of table 3 because of different criteria for settling accounts.




   Personal
   Corporate
Individuals
   Capi l y elds
   Other
tio  on n t profits
ivil serv ce social security contributions
her
Memorandum items
   Tax burden
   ICMS
TABLE 5
Brazil: Structure and growth of social security benefits
As percentage of legal minimum wage  Average annual growth (%)
(as of December 2002) 1994-1998 1998-2002
Total prestaciones 164 4.2 3.5
Seguridad social 172 3.7 3.4
Pensiones 187 4.1 2.9
Por edad de jubilación 113 1.9 3.4
Por años de servicio 360 11.5 2.2
Por invalidez 135 1.0 2.5
Asignaciones 130 3.8 3.0
Otros 224 –3.0 12.6
Servicios de apoyo 114 7.3 4.5
Source: Ministry of Welfare and Social Assistance (various years).
benefits
ocial security
   Pensions
      By retirement age
      By length of service
      For disabi ty
   Allowances
   Other
Aid support
30 years of contributions, respectively, which can
reduce the retirement age considerably. From 1995 to
1998, length-of-service pension benefits increased by
an annual average of 11.5%, compared to 4.2% for
overall benefits (table 5). This situation has changed
in recent years with the approval of the social security
reform and the consequent reduction in retirement
applications. Lastly, the number of social security
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the authorities’  room for fiscal adjustment in the short
run.
Summing up, overall non-financial expenditure,
including transfers to states and municipalities and the
Central Bank deficit, grew by 7.0% a year in real terms
during the first Cardoso administration and 4.6% a year
during the second. Expenditure growth was well above
real GDP growth during the same period (table 6 and
figure 3 show expenditures deflated by the implicit GDP
deflator).
2. States and municipalities
The primary balances of states and municipalities
deteriorated progressively from 1994 to 1998 and
improved gradually after 1998, particularly in the case
beneficiaries increased at rates above GDP growth,
leading to an increase in the ratio of social security
expenditure to GDP. This was partly associated with the
increase in the assistance component of social welfare,
which covers people on the minimum wage who have
never previously contributed to social security.
d) Other costs and capital (OCC) expenses
The major increase in OCC expenses took place in
1997-1998 (table 3). By contrast, they were squeezed
in 1999-2000, following the signing of the Stand-By
Agreement with IMF at end-1998.16  However, they
increased in 2001-2002, partly reflecting their
increasing rigidity as some public-sector agencies
committed to higher expenditure to protect their
resources. The division of responsibility between the
executive and legislature for the increasing rigidity of
OCC expenses is a matter of controversy.17
The share of non-discretionary expenditures in the
OCC expenses increased substantially, from 20% in
1999 to 60% in 2002, including health, employment
insurance, and the anti-poverty fund. Most of the
commitments are relatively new ones, arising from
legal or constitutional provisions approved in recent
years. The existence of this spending rigidity reduces
16 In 1999, other costs and capital expenses excluding the Workers’
Protection Fund (FAT) fell by 11% in nominal terms. At the start of
1999, this item was considered impossible to cut despite the increase
seen since 1994. The contraction of 1999 suggests that OCC expenses
in previous years could have been lower.
17 Although the executive bears most of the responsibility for the
increasing rigidity of OCC expenses, in some years the rigidity was
the result of larger commitments due to legislature initiatives such
as the anti-poverty fund.
TABLE 6
Brazil: Real growth of federal government non-financial expenditurea
(Percentage averages)
1994-1998 1998-2002 1994-2002
Gasto no financiero 7.0 4.6 5.8
Gastos de personal 2.0 4.2 3.1
Prestaciones de seguridad social 7.4 5.0 6.2
Transferencias a estados y municipios 6.6 11.0 8.8
Gastos de capital y otros costosb 12.3 0.7 6.3
Partida pro memoria
Crecimiento real del PIB 2.6 2.1 2.1
Source: Economic Policy Secretariat, Ministry of Finance.
a Implicit GDP deflator.
b Includes Central Bank primary balance.











Brazil: Federal government non-financial
expenditurea
(Billions of 2002 reais)
Source: National Treasury, Ministry of Finance.
a Expenditure corrected by the implicit GDP deflator.
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of the states (tables 1 and 2). The improvement in state
and municipal primary balances, which was substantial,
was due partly to the constraints placed on their
budgets by the bilateral agreements they signed with
the federal government to refinance their debts, partly
to the provisions of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. Their
finances also benefited from higher tax revenues on
some products and services that experienced large price
increases and represented a large share of their
revenues, such as oil, telecommunications and
electricity.
The efforts to control state and municipal finances
started in 1993, when Cardoso was still Finance
Minister at the end of the Collor administration. On 17
March 1993, an amendment to paragraph 4 of article
167 of the Constitution was passed, allowing the states
to pledge their own revenues and federal government
transfers as collateral for debt rescheduling agreements
with the federal government. This amendment was
instrumental in the success of the bilateral debt
agreements and meant that all later disputes brought
by states to the Supreme Court were defeated. On 5
November 1993 Law 8727 was passed, allowing the
federal government to refinance state debts with five
federal banks, provided that the states paid over at least
11% of their revenues and allowed transfers from the
federal government to be withheld if payments were
missed. The first bilateral debt agreements under the
terms of this law were signed in 1994. On 30
November 1995, the National Monetary Council
approved Vote 162/95, making debt refinancing
conditional for the first time on fiscal commitments by
the states. These three measures paved the way for the
passing of Law 9496 of 1997, which allowed the
refinancing of states’  remaining bonded debt.18 Under
the 1997 law, the bilateral agreements between the
federal government and states and municipalities
established minimum monthly payments of 13% to
15% of revenues (with a ceiling of 30%) over 30 years,
and real interest rates of 6% a year. The refinancing
of the debts was collateralized with federal government
transfers and revenues from the sales tax on
merchandise and services (ICMS, the state VAT), which
effectively prevented states from defaulting on their
obligations to the federal government since such a
default would block transfers and allow the National
Treasury to appropriate states’  ICMS revenues directly.
These bilateral agreements prompted states and
municipalities to modify their fiscal stances and
generate primary surpluses to meet their debt
obligations.
In addition to the bilateral agreements, the other
important institutional landmark was the passing of the
Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2000. Among other things,
this set ceilings for public-sector payrolls in terms of
government revenues and prohibited the refinancing of
state and municipal debts by the federal government,
putting an end to the moral hazard resulting from the
private sector lending to state and municipal
governments in the expectation that the National
Treasury would ultimately pick up the bill. For the first
time states and municipalities faced a tight budget
constraint.
The fiscal adjustment at state and municipal level
also benefited from the increase in state tax revenues,
as well as transfers from the federal government. After
1998, ICMS (state VAT) revenues increased, reflecting
improved fiscal administration by the governors elected
that year and the fact that ICMS revenue was partly
concentrated in sectors that led the recovery in growth,
such as telecommunications, and/or underwent tariff
increases, such as petrol and oil derivatives in general.
Between 1998 and 2002, ICMS revenue rose from 6.7%
to 7.9% of GDP. At the same time, transfers to states
and municipalities rose from 3% to 4.3% of GDP, as a
result of changes made to legislation after pressure
from state governors, particularly the revision of the
Kandir Law.19 Owing to these two effects, state and
municipal revenues rose by 2.5% of GDP during the
period 1999-2002, explaining most of the improvement
in their primary balance.
3. Public-sector enterprises
The primary balance of public-sector enterprises has
also improved since 1999 (table 7). In the case of
federal enterprises, the improvement was mainly due
to the results of the State oil company (Petrobras),
which benefited from the increase in international oil
18 In the case of the states, the first bilateral agreement under Law
9496 was signed in May 1997 and the last in October 1999. In the
case of the municipalities, the first agreement was signed in July
1999 and the last in May 2000.
19 The Kandir Law was negotiated between the federal and state
governments before the 1999 devaluation to provide a tax incentive
for exporters: states would lift ICMS tax on exports in exchange for
compensation payments from the federal government. Subsequently,
the states claimed that the compensation payments had been wrongly
calculated, and succeeded in obtaining from the federal government
a commitment to provide substantial supplementary transfers over
a period of several years.
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20 In 2001-2002 the average aggregate primary surplus for federal
enterprises, including Itaipu Binacional, was approximately 0.5%
of GDP. This primary surplus breaks down into a surplus of 0.4% of
GDP for Petrobras and 0.2% of GDP for Itaipu, and a primary deficit
of 0.1% for the Eletrobrás group, explained by the fall in revenues
due to the energy crisis, combined with an increase in investments.
The other federal enterprises generated a primary result close to zero.
TABLE 7
Brazil: Primary balance of public-sector enterprises
(Percentages of GDP)a
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total balance 1.2 –0.1 0.1 0.1 –0.4 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.7
Empresas federales 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 –0.2 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.5
Ingresos 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.2 7.0 6.8 8.1 8.4 …
Gastos no financieros 9.0 8.5 8.3 7.9 7.2 6.7 7.5 8.5 …
Salarios 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 …
Otros gastos 5.8 5.6 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.8 5.6 6.4 …
Inversiones 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.3
Otros gastos de capital 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 …
Ajustes 1.7 0.2 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 0.6 0.3 0.7 …
Empresas estaduales y municipales 0.0 –0.5 –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3
Empresas estaduales … –0.5 –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3
Empresas municipales … 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Ministry of Planning and Central Bank of Brazil.
a The minus sign indicates a deficit.
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prices in 1999. This rise in international market prices
increased domestic prices but affected only part of
Petrobras’s costs, since most of the oil products it sells
derive from domestic production. The improvement in
Petrobras’s balance also created some scope for public-
sector enterprises in general to invest more without
affecting the PSBR.20
The primary balance of state and municipal
enterprises improved because of the privatization of
loss-making enterprises and changes in the
management of those that remained in state hands. In
general, state authorities appointed managers who were




Making up for the gradual loss of temporary revenues
will be a challenge. The adjustment will have to include
a combination of spending cuts, the phasing out of
temporary revenues, and possibly the transformation of
some temporary revenues into permanent ones.
At the end of 1993, the provisional financial
transactions tax (IPMF) was approved, only to be
abolished a year later. At that point the government
introduced “ temporary”  or “one-off”  revenue-raising
measures, and this would become a common practice
in subsequent years.21 Taken all together, extraordinary
revenues peaked at over 3% of GDP in 1999, and
continued to contribute an average of 2.5% of GDP in
2000-2002 (table 8).
While the IPMF was abolished in 1994, the same tax
was reintroduced as the provisional financial transactions
contribution (CPMF) in 1997 and extended in subsequent
years. In 1994, the Social Emergency Fund (FSE) was
created as a mechanism whereby the federal government
retained part of its transfers to states and municipalities
for a two-year period (1994 and 1995). This fund was
21 “Temporary revenues”  means a source of adjustment that is not
protracted over time. The definition of what exactly constitutes such
revenues is to some extent arbitrary. We include in that category
only strictly temporary revenues (in force for only a year) or revenues
that would tend to disappear in the absence of any modification to
the legislation giving rise to them.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 5  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 5
BRAZILIAN FISCAL INSTITUTIONS: THE CARDOSO REFORMS, 1995-2002 • FABIO GIAMBIAGI AND MARCIO RONCI
71
subsequently renewed in 1996 for a year and a half, with
the same characteristics and a new name (Fiscal
Stabilization Fund, FEF). The FEF was further renewed
—albeit subject to a gradual increase in transfers to
municipalities— for another two and a half years in mid-
1997, not being abolished until December 1999.
In addition, significant revenues were generated
from the auction of mobile telephony concessions and
TABLE 8
Brazil: Temporary federal government revenues
(Percentages of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total 0.5 0.5 1.4 2.8 3.2 2.3 2.3 2.9
IPMF/CPMFa 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.5
Concesiones 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3
Impuesto adicional a la renta de las personas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Impuesto adicional a la renta de valores 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Impuesto adicional a la renta por remesas externas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Término de la rebaja de la COFINS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Fondo de estabilidad fiscal 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Recaudación de impuestos atrasados 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.7
Source: Authors’  estimates.
a IPMF/CPMF = Provisional financial transactions tax/provisional financial transactions contribution.
sion
Additional personal income tax
Additional in ome t x on securities
Additional in ome t x on external remittances
End of COFINS re ate
iscal stability fund (FEF)
Collection of arrears
the privatization of the State telecommunications
company (Telebras). Part of the Telebras privatization
receipts (40%) were treated as tax revenues for the
purpose of determining the public-sector deficit, by
contrast with other privatizations, which did not affect
the public-sector deficit. Also, overdue taxes were
collected after relief had been granted on penalty
interest for arrears.22
22 Other measures were also implemented, including a personal
income tax surcharge for higher bracket taxpayers from 1998
onward; exceptionally, in 1998, the double taxation of income from
financial applications; an income tax surcharge on profits made by
certain operations from the 1999 currency devaluation; the
temporary suspension, from 1999 onward, of the tax-deductibility
of a portion of the contribution to the financing of the social security
system (COFINS) that was initially allowed for the purpose of paying
corporate income tax; the payment of overdue tax by pension funds
in 2002, etc.
V
Hidden liabilities and the growth of public debt
The ratio of public debt to GDP, including the monetary
base, fell from a peak of 56% in 1984 to 30% in 1994
due to a combination of high seigniorage, low
operating deficits in the first half of the 1990s, below-
inflation correction of the face value of the debt, and
accumulated economic growth of 32% over the period
1985-1994. Between 1994 and 1998 the ratio rose
sharply, mainly as a result of persistent public-sector
deficits. By the end of 1998 the government had run
out of alternatives for financing the deficit (table 9):
seigniorage was low, a return to inflation was
unanimously rejected by all political groups, the high
level of external debt had led to a collapse in the
exchange rate, the domestic debt was becoming ever
costlier to roll over and privatization was coming to
an end. Under these circumstances, the government
initiated the process of fiscal adjustment under an IMF-
supported programme.23
During the period 1995-1998 the total public debt
increased, owing mainly to the issuance of public
securities and partly to the transfer of individual state
debts to the federal government. This increase in the
23 See Pastore (1995), Tanner (1995) and Rocha (1997) for an
account of the historical roots of Brazil’s public-sector debt.
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federal government’s liabilities did not immediately
affect the net public debt, but it was not neutral as the
assets and liabilities in question involved different costs
and maturities (Werneck and Bevilacqua, 1998). As a
consequence, the total public-sector debt, including the
monetary base, rose by 12% of GDP between 1994 and
1998, while the domestic debt in public securities
increased by 23% of GDP in the same period.
After 1999, despite the adjustment of the primary
balance, total public debt increased because of the
impact of the devaluation on the foreign public debt
and the dollar-denominated domestic public debt,
whose share of the total had risen sharply over the
previous two years. At the time of devaluation, the
dollar-denominated public debt represented 14% of GDP
(or 30% of the total public debt). With the sharp fall
of the Brazilian currency against the dollar in 2000-
2002, the dollar-denominated debt increased
substantially in value, reaching 29% of GDP (or 50%
of total public debt) in late 2002 (table 9).
Central to the evolution of the public-sector debt
that began in the mid-1990s were the “balance sheet
adjustments”  (Passini, 2000; Kawall, Costa and
Gomes, 2000) resulting from three factors:
TABLE 9
Brazil: Net public-sector debt
(Percentages of GDP)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total deudaa 30.0 30.6 33.3 34.3 41.7 48.7 48.8 52.6 55.5
Gobierno federal 13.0 13.3 16.0 18.6 24.9 29.8 30.6 32.7 35.3
Estados y municipios 9.9 10.7 11.5 12.9 14.2 16.2 16.0 18.3 18.5
Empresas del sector público 7.1 6.6 5.8 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.7
Deuda interna 21.5 25.1 29.4 30.0 35.5 38.4 39.2 42.2 41.2
Gobierno federal 6.7 9.8 14.4 16.7 20.8 21.9 23.2 24.5 22.9
Base monetaria 3.6 3.1 2.4 3.6 4.2 4.6 4.2 4.2 4.6
Deuda actualizadab 11.7 15.6 21.4 28.1 34.5 38.6 41.8 48.1 37.8
Créditos del Banco Central de Brasilc –4.6 –5.3 –8.5 –7.8 –5.6 –4.4 –3.7 –3.2 –2.6
Refinanciamiento de los estados y
   municipios y PROES 0.0 0.0 0.0 –5.4 –9.3 –12.4 –13.4 –13.9 –13.7
Fondo de Protección del Trabajador (FAT) –2.0 –2.5 –2.5 –2.6 –3.5 –3.9 –4.4 –4.9 –4.8
Otros –2.0 –1.1 1.6 0.8 0.5 –0.6 –1.3 –5.8 1.6
Estados y municipios 9.6 10.4 11.1 12.4 13.5 15.3 15.1 17.3 17.1
Refinanciamiento de estados y municipios 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 9.3 12.4 13.4 13.9 13.7
Deuda convertida 4.8 5.6 6.2 4.3 2.4 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Otros 4.8 4.8 4.9 2.7 1.8 1.6 1.5 3.2 3.3
Empresas del sector público 5.2 4.9 3.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.4 1.2
Deuda pública externa 8.5 5.5 3.9 4.3 6.2 10.3 9.6 10.4 14.3
Gobierno federal 6.3 3.5 1.6 1.9 4.1 7.9 7.4 8.2 12.4
Estados y municipios 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.4
Empresas públicas 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.5
Partidas pro memoria
Deuda fiscald 30.0 30.6 31.4 34.2 40.6 40.7 40.9 40.8 36.1
Ajuste del balance (acciones) 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.1 1.1 8.0 7.9 11.8 19.4
Privatizaciones 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –2.0 –3.3 –3.8 –5.2 –4.8 –4.0
Otros 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.1 4.4 11.8 13.1 16.6 23.4
Ajuste de la deuda interna 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 4.2 4.6 6.0 9.6
Ajuste de la deuda externa 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 3.2 3.8 4.4 8.0
Otros 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 3.5 4.4 4.7 6.2 5.8
Deuda en dólares 9.5 6.3 5.9 8.7 13.5 19.6 19.6 25.0 28.9
(porcentaje de la deuda total) 31.7 20.6 17.7 25.4 32.4 40.2 40.2 47.5 52.1
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
a Includes the monetary base and balance sheet adjustments.
b Includes swap operations from 2002.
c Central Bank lending to financial institutions.
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_ the recognition of old debts that had affected
aggregate demand in the past but were not
properly registered in the fiscal statistics at the
time (the so-called “skeletons” );
_ variations in the value of the debt due to
exchange-rate fluctuations, and
_ privatization receipts, which were used to reduce
the public debt.
Prior to 1995, these factors were not clearly
recorded in the fiscal statistics. In all, between 1999
sector debt, when a tight monetary policy means that
fiscal imbalances leave prices unaffected in the short
term, only to aggravate future fiscal imbalances by way
of a higher interest burden (Sargent and Wallace, 1981).
The crisis of 1998-1999 changed this situation,
strengthening the advocates of tighter fiscal policy in
the Cardoso administration. In fact, the fiscal
adjustment was imposed by circumstances, since
without it Brazil would certainly have headed towards
a domestic public debt moratorium. Sure enough,
President Cardoso —who was convinced that higher
taxes and spending cuts were an important precondition
for IMF support— gave the necessary backing to the
austere fiscal measures required and took the lead in
the negotiations with the National Congress to pass the
necessary enabling legislation. Under these conditions,
the relatively passive fiscal attitude of the first Cardoso
administration gave way to active support for a fiscal
effort to curb the rising public debt.
Two qualifications are important. First, rather than
a change of attitude on the part of the authorities, some
have suggested that there was simply a greater concern
with financing expenditure adequately, since the
public-sector spending-to-GDP ratio was never reduced.
Second, the adjustment was partly based on temporary
revenues such as the CPMF and the additional earnings
of Petrobras due to the rise in fuel prices. This by no
means detracts from the fiscal effort made in 1999-
2002, but it does highlight the need to persist with and
improve the adjustment over the coming years.
24 The exchange rate has a twofold impact on the debt through a
balance sheet adjustment: the foreign public debt increases, as does
the dollar-denominated domestic debt. This effect was particularly
strong in 1999, 2001 and 2002, and explains the jumps in the ratio
of debt to GDP despite the solid primary results observed after 1998.
25 A more generous view of the official stance prior to 1999 would
acknowledge that during 1995-1998 the government had an
ambitious reform agenda involving the passing of constitutional
amendments, some of which were important for the subsequent fiscal
adjustment (such as social welfare reform, which took a long time
to negotiate with Congress). The focus on the reforms, it can be
argued, led to a relaxation in short-term fiscal flows, favoured by a
benign external environment that financed growing current-account
deficits until 1999. To conclude that, in such an environment, it
would have been possible to achieve the same type of budgetary
constraint during 1995-1998 as was observed during 1999-2002 is
counterfactual and not easy to demonstrate.
and 2002 the sum of the first two effects represented
a cumulative increase of 19% of GDP in the public-
sector debt, while privatization reduced the debt by 1%
of GDP, the result being a net increase of about 18% of
GDP. This partly explains why, although Brazil met its
fiscal commitments and even exceeded the targets set
in its agreement with the IMF, the public-sector debt-
to-GDP ratio increased from its pre-devaluation level of
1999.24
VI
The fiscal attitude of the authorities
The authorities did not display the same rigour in
controlling the public-sector accounts prior to 1998 as
they did after 1999 in the context of an external and
fiscal crisis.25 Expenditures that were under direct
government control and not subject to legal or
constitutional restrictions expanded vigorously during
the first Cardoso administration, and proposals for
adopting fiscal targets did not receive any support
before 1998.
As had previously happened for more than two
decades, Brazil experienced a situation of “soft budget
constraint”  (Kornai, 1986, p. 4). The natural tendency
of a “soft budget constraint”  is for the adjustment to take
place either through higher inflation, when monetary
policy is accommodating, or through higher public-
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VII
The future of fiscal sustainability
The government’ s attitude to fiscal policy changed
dramatically with the external and fiscal crisis of 1998-
1999. As a result, the supporters of more austere fiscal
policies in Cardoso’ s administration had their case
strengthened and were able to sway policy decision-
making towards tighter policies of a kind which had
gathered little support prior to 1998. Just 10 days
before the 1998 elections, President Cardoso made a
speech that gave a clear indication of the approaching
austerity. He emphasized that “we have to ensure that
the State lives within its means”  by generating primary
surpluses “ that are sufficient to prevent the public-
sector debt from growing at a rate above that of GDP,
so that the ratio of the two is kept stable over time” .26
While this might sound trivial, the contrast between the
President’s statement and the trend in the public debt
in previous years was remarkable. Even such an
obvious point would have been extremely hard to make
as little as six months before. The political conditions
for adopting a more austere fiscal attitude were created
by the dramatic external crisis, when outflows of
foreign currency reserves had reached US$ 1 billion a
day as a result not only of the overvalued exchange rate
but also of the unsustainable fiscal situation.
The problem President Cardoso inherited in the
mid-1990s was deep-rooted: since 1954, populist
expansionary policies had alternated with brief
intervals of conservative reformism.27 The crisis of
1998-1999 created the conditions for a political climate
favourable to measures for addressing deep structural
fiscal imbalances and, most importantly, to austerity
as a norm of public administration, a genuine departure
from the old fiscal extravagance. Whether this change
in the authorities’  fiscal attitude will last is something
that the coming years will show.28
Yet the adjustment observed after 1999 was based
to a large extent on increased revenues, since overall
public-sector spending was unaffected in real terms.
Non-financial expenditure by the federal government,
including transfers to states and municipalities and the
small Central Bank deficit, increased continuously in
real terms in every year of the eight-year period covered
by the two Cardoso administrations, without exception.
Also, it seems justifiable for Brazil —whose
credibility has been undermined by years of repressed
hyperinflation, large deficits and rising public-sector
debt— to continue to sustain large primary surpluses
for several years, before gradually reducing the primary
surplus at a time when this does not affect the evolution
of the public-sector debt.
These aspects of Cardoso’ s fiscal adjustment
underline the need to preserve hard-won fiscal
discipline over the coming years. To improve the
quality of the adjustment, it will be necessary to offset
the gradual phasing out of temporary revenues by
making some of these revenues permanent and by
cutting public expenditure across the board in the
budget. Non-discretionary expenses will also have to
be reduced to make more room for fiscal adjustments
in the short run.
Key to achieving fiscal sustainability has been the
austere attitude of the authorities, which should be
permanently embedded in the fiscal institutions. One
possible alternative would be to have the Fiscal
Responsibility Act complemented by a fiscal solvency
act that established clear and permanent rules for public
debt sustainability over the medium term, in the form
of either a ceiling on borrowing requirements or a floor
for the primary surplus.29 The fiscal solvency act would
help to address the fiscal consequences of political
fragmentation, as well as the legitimate pressure for
more social spending in the coming years. Also, it
could improve the trade-off between fiscal adjustment
and economic growth in the short term by
strengthening credibility and allowing lower interest
rates. However, the outcome of any legal reform of
26 Translated from Jornal do Brasil, September 24, 1998.
27 See Rabello de Castro and Ronci (1991).
28 An important element in greater fiscal control has been the
improvement of public-sector statistics since 1995.
29 While the Fiscal Responsibility Act and the refinancing of state
and municipal debts placed a tight budgetary constraint on the fis-
cal regimes of states and municipalities, the federal government
budget has not been constrained in the same way. The federal
government’s primary surplus targets are valid only for the current
budget year and can be revised in the following year: in principle,
there is no clear and durable constraint on the federal government
budget that can prevent a substantial reduction in the primary surplus,
leading potentially to a rising debt-to-GDP ratio.
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APPENDIX
Public debt sustainability, 1995-2002
Despite Cardoso’s fiscal reforms and the remarkable shift to
austerity after 1999, the evidence suggests that the public debt
was not sustainable either in 1995-2002 or in 1999-2002; in
other words, fiscal policy was not tight enough to contain
the growth in the public debt.
We follow the technique presented by Wilcox (1989)
and Luporini (2000) to test for fiscal sustainability during the
period from January 1995 to December 2002. This consists
in testing the discounted public debt for stationarity (unit
roots). If the discounted public debt were stationary (rejection
of unit root hypothesis), the public debt would be sustainable
on the basis of the fiscal policy followed during the sample
period.
The data set consists of monthly data on the
consolidated net public debt at par value. Nominal debt was
divided by the general price index. The real discount factors
were calculated by dividing the Special System of Clearance
and Custody (SELIC) interest rate by the general price index.30
Figure A.1 shows the public debt and the discounted public
debt, both expressed in December 2002 reais.
Brazil’ s fiscal institutions will depend crucially on
policymakers and politicians understanding that fiscal
sustainability is a valuable public good, and a necessary
condition for economic growth. Without this
understanding, any legal reform of Brazil’ s fiscal
institutions will inevitably be short-lived.
FIGURE A1
Brazil: Total net public debt
(Billions of December 2002 reais)




























































































30 Ideally, the net-of-taxes real interest rate should be used.
Estimating the net-of-tax yield on securities is virtually impossible,
however, as tax rates vary between holders and there is limited
information on the identity of these.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 5  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 5
BRAZILIAN FISCAL INSTITUTIONS: THE CARDOSO REFORMS, 1995-2002 • FABIO GIAMBIAGI AND MARCIO RONCI
76
Bibliography
Alem, A.C. and F. Giambiagi (1999): Finanças publicas: teoria e
pratica no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Campus.
Barbosa, F., A. Salazar Brandão and C. de Faro (1989): Fiscal
Reform and Stabilization: the Brazilian Experience, Rio de
Janeiro, Fundação Getulio Vargas, August.
Central Bank of Brazil (2000): Relatório Focus, Brasilia, 16 October.
Enders, W. (1995): Applied Econometric Time Series, New York,
John Wiley and Sons.
Ferreira, A. and G. Tullio (2002): The Brazilian exchange rate crisis
of January 1999, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 34,
No. 1, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Garcia, M.G.P. and T. Didier (2000): Taxa de juros, risco cambial
e risco Brasil, document presented at the III Encontro da
Economia da Região Sul, September, Anpec Sul.
Giambiagi, F. (1997): Necessidades de financiamento do setor
publico 1991/96: bases para a discussão do ajuste fiscal no
Brasil, Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, vol. 27, No. 1,
Rio de Janeiro, Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA),
April.
Giambiagi, F. and M. Ronci (2004): Fiscal Policy and Debt
Sustainability: Cardoso’s Brazil, 1995-2002, IMF Working
Paper WP/04/156, Washington, D.C., August.
Jornal do Brasil (1998): 24 September.
Kawall, C.L.F, R. Costa, and T.G. Gomes (2000): A dívida publica
e os esqueletos, Economic Update, Citibank, 29 September.
Kornai, J. (1986): The soft budget constraint, Kyklos, vol. 39, No. 1,
Cambridge, Blackwell Publishing.
Luporini, V. (2000): Sustainability of the Brazilian fiscal policy and
Central Bank independence, Revista Brasileira de Economia,
vol. 54, No. 2, Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Getulio Vargas,
January/March.
Mendonça de Barros, J.R. and M.F. Almeida (1996): A reestruturação
do sistema financeiro, Gazeta Mercantil, 26 August.
Ministry of Welfare and Social Assistance (various years): Anuario
estadístico da previdência social.
North, D.C. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Ornelas, W. and S. Vieira (1999): As novas regras da previdência
social, Conjuntura Econômica, vol. 53, No. 11, Rio de Janeiro,
Fundação Getulio Vargas, November.
Passini, S. (2000): Fiscal Skeletons in Brazil, Stanford, UBS Warburg,
September.
Pastore, A. (1995): Déficit público, a sustentabilidade das dividas
interna e externa, segnoriagem e inflação: uma análise do
regime monetário brasileiro, Revista de Econometria, vol. 14,
No. 2, Rio de Janeiro, Sociedad Brasileira de Econometria.
Rabello de Castro, P. and M. Ronci (1991): Sixty years of populism
in Brazil, in R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards (eds.), The
Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press.
Rezende, A.L. (1990): Estabilização e reforma: 1964-1967, in M. de
Paiva Abreu (ed.), A ordem do progresso: cem anos de política
econômica republicana, 1889-1989, Rio de Janeiro, Editora
Campus.
Rocha, F. (1997): Long-run limits on the Brazilian government debt,
Revista Brasileira de Economia, vol. 51, No. 4, Rio de Janeiro,
Fundação Getulio Vargas, October/December.
Sargent, T.J. and N. Wallace (1981): Some unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic, Quarterly Review, vol. 5, No. 3, Minneapolis,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
TABLE A.1
Brazil: Testing for stationarity of the discounted public debt
Sample period January 1995-December 2002 January 1995-December 1998 January 1999-December 2002
Null hypothesis of unit root Not rejected at Not rejected at Not rejected at
10% level 10% level 10% level
Prueba de Dickey-Fuller aumentada  0.17651 –3.048911 –1.880546
(Probabilidad) (–0.9976) (0.1281) (0.6522)
Valores críticos de la prueba
1% de significación –4.045236 –4.118444 –4.118444
5% de significación –3.451959 –3.486509 –3.486509
10% de significación –3.151440 –3.171541 –3.171541
Número de rezagos 6 2 6
Número de observaciones 96 48 48
Source: Authors’  estimates.
Augmented Dickey-Fu ler test
ty)
Test critical values
   level
   level
   level
u ber of lags
u ber of r tions
31 We carried out the augmented Dickey-Fuller testing following
the methodology described by Enders (1995).
Table A.1 summarizes the testing for stationarity of
the discounted net public debt t using the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test.31 The unit root hypothesis is not rejected
for all sample periods, confirming that, despite all
government efforts, fiscal policy was not tight enough to
make the public debt sustainable between January 1995 and
December 2002 and between January 1999 and December
2002.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 5  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 5
BRAZILIAN FISCAL INSTITUTIONS: THE CARDOSO REFORMS, 1995-2002 • FABIO GIAMBIAGI AND MARCIO RONCI
77
Skidmore, T.E. (1988): The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil,
1964-85, New York, Oxford University Press.
Tanner, E. (1995): Intertemporal solvency and indexed debt in Brazil:
evidence from 1976-1991, Journal of International Money and
Finance, vol. 14, No. 4, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, August.
Velloso, R. (1997): Uma proposta para acelerar o ajuste fiscal, in
J.P. dos Reis Velloso (ed.), Brasil: desafios de um pais em
transformação, Rio de Janeiro, Jose Olympio Editora.
Werneck, R.L.F. and A.S. Bevilaqua (1998): The Quality of the
Federal Net Debt in Brazil, Texto para discussão, No. 385,
Rio de Janeiro, Pontificia Universidade Catolica, April.
Wilcox, D.W. (1989): The sustainability of government deficits:
implications of the present-value borrowing constraint, Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 21, No. 3, Ohio, Ohio
State University Press, August.
